Operationally, then, unity of command was applied.

But it was applied, on one hand, by the US Congress. The Reorganization Act has effectively placed the operational employment of troops in the joint system. Therefore, the single responsible commander, the CINC, is no longer fettered by conflicting operational direction from the services. Unity of command was also facilitated by Thurman’s decision to place all forces under the operational control of JTF South. Such had not always been the plan, and there was a conscious decision on Thurman’s part to direct that change.

Security. Security can be achieved by three means; namely, applying operational security (OPSEC) measures, hiding a force or being deceiving as to its intent, and using combat power. The planning and execution of Just Cause saw the application of all three of those measures.

Planning for the possibility of US forces being committed against the PDF in Panama began with the JCS Planning Order on 28 February 1988. (14) Although the resulting Blue Spoon operation order was updated in October 1989, many of the objectives remained virtually unchanged. The fact that the US forces did not encounter more difficult obstacles and resistance on their respective objectives indicates that the OPSEC of the plan was maintained throughout the nearly two years of its existence. Proper OPSEC appears to have been maintained.

Combat preparations were effectively hidden from PDF cognizance. For example, while the PURPLE STORM and SAND FLEA exercises, which JTF Panama conducted during the latter half of 1989, were to exercise US treaty rights, they also served an ancillary purpose of conditioning the PDF to US force movements in Panama. Additionally, tactical commanders could rehearse their missions on their actual objectives. The six separate deployments of security enhancement forces to Panama over the preceding two years conditioned the PDF – and more important, Noriega — to the United States dispatching troops without decisive result during periods of increased tension. (15) Other preparations, such as infiltrating and hiding M551 tanks and AH-64 helicopters, were conducted more conventionally. These weapons systems arrived during the hours of darkness and were kept from public view until there were operationally required. As the foregoing relates, security was enhanced by each of these actions.

Finally, security can also be achieved through strength. There is little doubt that one reason the enemy never "acquired an unexpected advantage" is because he generally chose not to fight. After the initial actions, he realized his military position was hopeless. The PDF, despite its organization as a military force, did not have the means to counter the armed strength of the United States. The PDF was essentially destroyed as a conventional fighting force and was not able to make the transition to a guerrilla army throughout the operation, if such was its intention. Strength ensured security.

Surprise. There has been a good deal of discussion on whether the PDF was alerted to Just Cause and whether surprise was maintained. With the cable news networks’ coverage of events at Fort Bragg, North Carolina over the two days before H-hour, only a megalomaniac would have discounted the possibility of an invasion. That a leak occurred in the hours before the invasion had been neither denied nor confirmed. Regardless of a leak, no army can strike without giving indications of impending operations. As a snake must coil to strike, so also must an army reposition and marshal its assets and move to its jump-off point, either by air, ground, or sea. Since firing actually began before H-hour, surprise was lost at least on one occasion. (16)

Surprise is not a homogeneous factor on a battlefield and must be viewed at several levels. As I have discussed, Just Cause may have been compromised at the operational level. Whether through prior notification, the reporting of the news networks, or proper analysis of a variety of indicators, certain leaders within the PDF expected the invasion. From the tactical perspective, however, the secrecy concerning the nature and timing of the attack appears to have been maintained.

Strategically, surprise was maintained, despite its loss a the operational level. The critical command node in the PDF was Noriega. Noriega’s actions on the night of the invasion and in the ensuing days demonstrate that he was surprised. Over the previous two years, the United States had deployed security enhancement forces to Panama on six separate occasions. Troop strength on the ground had increased more than 30 percent. US forces had traded shots with PDF intruders at a petroleum tank farm off and on for 20 months. For six months. The United States had conducted a series of exercises designed to reassert treaty rights. (17)

Despite all of these actions, nothing changed Noriega and his government remained firmly in control. From Noriega's perspective, the United States did not have the will to take any truly decisive action. The previous troop deployments and exercises lulled Noriega into believing that the United States did not have the will to act in Panama.

Simplicity. Just Cause was a complex, finely tuned military operation made executable only through clear, concise orders and realistically conducted rehearsals. So, from the outside looking in, simplicity appears to have been lacking. If subordinate had not understood their tasks and had the operation not been rehearsed, military disaster might well have the result.

Panama was not a near, linear battlefield. Although, at the operational level, linear unit boundaries were assigned during the initial operations, they were of little value. The battlefield more resembled a lethal mosaic of separate attacks conducted by land, sea and air from the four points of the compass. For example, the 1^st Battalion (Airborne), 508^th Infantry conducted an air assault into Fort Amador from the south and then attacked west. Across the bay, less than a mile distant, a mechanized battalion attacked to the southeast to isolate the Comandancia. Supporting this mosaic was a variety of fixed- and rotary-wing lift and gunships, all of which required refueling either from Strategic Air Command tankers or forward arming and refueling points deployed to field sites. Air traffic control was a colossal effort at the local level.

Air traffic control was a monumental effort not only in Panama. More than 200 sorties deployed in an air train 67 miles long. (18) Planes marshaled from bases all over CONUS, converged, rendezvoused with tankers to refuel en route, evaded detection and delivered their loads at the appropriate place. Just Cause was complicated, indeed, but as with many of the principles, the perspective changes between the operational and tactical levels.

The fact that the operation was not a failure testifies to the simplicity of the plan at the tactical and lower end of the operational level. At the battalion level, the tasks were relatively straightforward, in that units were tasked to conduct doctrinally appropriate missions. Combat operations are never "easy," but, in Just Cause, they were straightforward: conduct a parachute assault to seize an airhead, attack to isolate… and so forth. The most complicated battalion missions fell to the battalions of the 82^nd Airborne Division. These three battalions conducted a parachute assault and assembled and subsequently conducted an air assault to seize an objective. (19)

At the lower end of the operational level, simplicity was enhanced by using clear, concise orders and using standard control measures to the brigade task forces. The brigade task forces from the 82^nd Airborne Division had the eastern half of Panama City. The Panama-based 193d Infantry Brigade was allotted the western portion of the city and the canal operating areas. The Marine task force was responsible for the Bridge of the Americas and the west bank, while the brigade from the 7^th Infantry Division was responsible for Colon. (20) Using standard orders and overlays simplified understanding the tasks and enhanced communications between headquarters.

It was primarily at the upper ends of the operational level of war that the operation became complicated. Delivering the force to the battlefield was a challenging, complicated task, possibly the most critical of the entire operation. A force must be delivered to the battlefield in a combat formation—ready to fight—to be able to fight. Despite tremendous obstacles, the Military Airlift Command delivered the combat formations.

Was the principle of simplicity applied? The answer is mixed. At the tactical and lower end of the operational level, the operation was kept simple. At the upper end of the operational, Just Cause was a complicated, yet finely tuned, military operation.

Was Just Cause as successful, doctrinally as it appears to have been portrayed? Were the principles of war applied? Should the principles be reviewed for applicability to short-duration contingency operations? There can be no doubt that the operation was extremely successful. But certain events indicate that, when the principles of war are applied to short-duration contingency operations in a LIC environment, the interpretation of the principles must be viewed within a broader context than normal. The forms that some of the principles may take are likely to be less traditional or "military" and more "police" or "political" in nature. As the analysis of the principle of maneuver showed, the principles are not always what the appear to be at first glance. Maneuver is more than just movement; only by understanding the components can the whole be understood. It is by examining the components of each of the principles against the political backdrop of LIC that we identify the forms they may take in contingency operations.

This discussion has been an attempt to generate thought on the applicability of the principles of war on Just Cause in particular and on contingency operations in general. If we are not to stagnate as a profession, we must critically examine our performance in the crucible of combat. Future knowledge and competence are founded on a thorough understanding of past conflict. The many after-action reviews (hot washes) of the participating units provided them with specific items toward which to guide future training. Hopefully, this discussion will spark a corresponding study of our doctrine. Remember, when our forces are committed to combat, not only will those in Washington not accept excuses but neither will the American people. MR

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(15) Security forces deployments for Panama were:

(19) JTF South Opord 90-1 (Blue Spoon), dated November 1989.