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On 20 September 1700 Johan Remmin, mayor of Dorpat, forwarded an account by a certain Jochen who had been sent by the town council to find out what was happening at Narva. Jochen explained that he last Wednesday had arrived at General Vellingk's estate Jewe (Jõhvi), where he had found a lot of peasants. These had destroyed all the windows and kept their horses in the mansion. The bailiff was said to be in Narva, while the priest had fled to Reval. The Russians had not yet appeared at Jewe, but had been seen in the area by associate judge Duncam's bailiff who had been out scouting. He had met about 50 Russians on foot, who were wearing white coats and four-cornered hats. Jochen had upon hearing this report turned back as he expected a larger force to be nearby.
Colonel Aminoff had also been to Jewe, but upon discovering that it was impossible to get through he had returned to Wesenberg.
The peasants had said that there were two Russian camps, one at Stöppelmanshoff and the other a few kilometers from Narva between Jurowa and Prestane. It was impossible to get through their lines. The enemy took all cattle and grain they could find and brought it to their camp. The countryside was in a sorry state. Almost all Germans had fled and the peasants were behaving worse than the enemy.
Source:
EAA 1.2.285
On 9 September 1700 Florian Thilo von Thilau sent a worrying report to governor General Dahlbergh in Riga. The Swedish trade representative Thomas Herbers in Pskov had been arrested and the nobility in the Pskov area was being mobilized. All russian lodias on their way to trade at Narva had been recalled to Pskov on 23 August. Thilo's spies had not yet been able to confirm that they had been reloaded with war materials, but many vessels of various sizes were waiting at Pskov. In regard to the previously persistent rumours about the sending of a Russian corps to support the Saxons there were at present no more news. According to a spy a considerable number of Saxon officers had recently arrived in Pskov and they were thought to be on their way to Moscow.
Everything remained quiet at Neuhausen and the peasants had been relieved to hear about the peace with Denmark. The arrival of Charles XII with an army was eagerly anticipated. Reports from Marienburg suggested that the Duke of Croy would command the Russian corps which would be sent to support the Saxons.
Thilo's next report apparently wasn't sent until 29 September. The previous letter hade been sent with a peasant, but recent news of the Saxon withdrawal indicated that the road was now open. The latest reports, Thilo wrote, were saying that the Russians had invaded Ingria and burnt a few churches. The peasants in the Pskov area were very worried about a Swedish counterattack since the only regular force present was the town's garrison.
News from Rappin spoke of Russian vessels having been observed near Ismene. Thilau noted that he had two weeks previously informed General Vellingk about this area being a key passage for any ships going to Narva.
Sources:
LVVA, fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 290
LVVA, fond 7349, op. 2, vol. 221
On 11 December 1701 Colonel Gustaf Ernst Albedyhl wrote to Governor General Dahlbergh in Riga. The Saxon commander of the fortress Dünamünde, the only remaining prize from the campaign of 1701, had offered to give up on honorable terms. Albedyhl was noncommittal, but pointed out the rather poor situation for the Swedish forces outside. He had held a council of war and the officers favored accepting the Saxon offer. In Albedyhl's opinion it would be unwise to refuse because it could result in the commander blowing up Dünamünde, destroying not only the fortress but also all presumptive trophies.
In his immediate reply Dahlbergh assured Albedyhl of full support. It would serve the King better to capture the fortress quickly and it made no sense to risk having it blown up by desperate Saxons. A destruction of trophies would damage the glory of King Charles. So Albedyhl should by all means enter into an agreement, but also make sure that it allowed him to take quick possession of Dünamünde.
In a subsequent report to the Chancery in Stockholm Dahlbergh outlined his thinking. The commander Colonel Kanitz had been cut off from alla support for 21 weeks. He had shown his fidelity to King Augustus and deserved to be treated honorably by the Swedes. Albedyhl had several days ago sent a courier to Charles XII to ask for orders, but no reply had yet been received. In this situation Dahlbergh had called all his generals and colonels to a council of war. The view of the majority had been that it was necessary to wait for the King's orders as he had previously declared that the garrison must surrender unconditionally. Reports from the army suggested that Charles had broken camp on the 3rd and Dahlbergh hoped that this would not mean further complications with the Polish republic. On the 12th Dahlbergh wrote to the King, informing him that an agreement had been signed.
The King's position on the matter did not become clear until the beginning of January 1702. On the first day of the new year he sent a letter to Albedyhl. Upon returning from an expedition into Lithuania he had been informed that Albedyhl had made an agreement without waiting for orders. Charles expressed his deep dislike of this. Had he not already shortly after the Düna crossing informed the Saxon commander that if he did not immediately turn over Dünamünde he would be considered as a rebel? Because of these circumstances Charles had every right to refuse to accept the agreement made by Kanitz and Albedyhl, but since some time had passed he would not make an issue of it. However, Albedyhl would do well to avoid a repetition and remember not to make such decisions without express orders.
Sources:
LVVA, fond 7349, op 1, vol. 73
LVVA, fond 7349, op. 2, vol. 235
Riksarkivet, Riksregistraturet
Adam Ludvig Lewenhaupt's memoirs, first published in 1757 and again in 1952 (possibly based on another manuscript) are rich in scoundrels, big and small, who in one way or another treated the general unfairly. One of the major villains is Field Marshal Rehnschiöld, who blames Lewenhaupt for almost everything which goes wrong at Poltava. This animosity would appear to have been rather new as the two had no personal contact whatsoever from late 1701 until the arrival of Lewenhaupt at the King's headquarters in the spring of 1708.
Whether they knew each other before the war is unclear, but one item strongly suggests it. On 18 July 1700 Lewenhaupt was appointed colonel of a regiment which was to be raised in Uppland, Dalarna and Västmanland. As he had never held any rank whatsoever in the Swedish army (according to his memoirs he could not accept having to start as a common soldier despite being from an illustrious family) this appointment came as a bit of shock to him. So why had Charles XII remembered him?
Well, it would appear that Lewenhaupt believed that Lieutenant General Carl Gustaf Rehnschiöld had put in a good word. On 8 August Lewenhaupt wrote to him, saying that the appointment no doubt was a result of a recommendation from Rehnschiöld. Besides expressing profound gratitude Lewenhaupt asked Rehnschiöld for advice. There was a shortage of officers and non-commissioned officers and the King undoubtedly wanted the regiment to be ready as soon as possible. Some officers had been found and expressed a willingness to serve. However, Lewenhaupt wasn't sure that the King accepted proposals from the colonels, but if he did perhaps Rehnschiöld could present him with Lewenhaupt's list? It seemed possible to find enough captains and lieutenants with previous military experience, but ensigns were harder to find. Lewenhaupt was inclined to go for young ambitious men without experience. Non-commissioned officers were even more difficult to recruit. Could Rehnschiöld give some advice? Perhaps some corporals from the old regiments? Lewenhaupt was also looking for a lieutenant colonel as the King had only appointed a major.
A rather amusing detail which adds to this letter: Ten days later Nils Gripenhielm, County Governor of Dalarna, wrote to Lewenhaupt about the efforts to raise the new regiment. There were many officers available in Dalarna, but Gripenhielm did not know if they would be willing to serve. It would be best if Lewenhaupt came to Dalarna himself. Gripenhielm noted that his own son Axel Johan (born in March 1686) wanted to join the army. He was only 15 years old (or rather 14), but Axel Johan was tall and energetic. Would there perhaps be a place for him in the regiment? Perhaps as officer, as he already knew the basics? Nils Gripenhielm's wife had a relative who was 17, who could perhaps be suitable as a non-commissioned officer? He was a bit short, but had recently grown considerably. The young man was the son of old major Gladtsten and his older brother was already an ensign in Dalregementet. The old major was very poor and had no way of helping his children.
Axel Johan Gripenhielm was appointed ensign in Lewenhaupt's regiment on 30 September 1700. He died in 1755, having reached the rank of Major General. Ensign Adam Gladtsten also survived the war and many years as a prisoner of war in Russia. He died in 1729. The fate of his younger brother Göran (who seems likely to have been the one Gripenhielm tried to help) is unclear. He is sometimes called "ensign", but with no details about where and how long he served. Date of death is also unknown.
Source: Linköpings Stiftsbibliotek, H 79:4, no 19 and no 24
P.S. Rehnschiöld had spent some time in the Netherlands in 1691 as a military aide and teacher to the young Duke Frederick IV of Holstein. He may have come into contact with Lewenhaupt, who was a lieutenant colonel in Magnus Wilhelm Nieroth's regiment.
On 8 May 1706 Henrik Falkenberg, deputy president of the Göta appellate court, wrote to Adam Ludvig Lewenhaupt who was in Stockholm on official business. It was, Falkenberg wrote, a great joy to hear that Charles XII had rewarded a member of an old family by promoting L. to Lieutenant General. Perhaps Lewenhaupt's successes in Courland would teach the King the difference between men from old and distinguished families and those who despite very few real accomplishments had risen (or perhaps rather brought up) from the dirt. Hopefully this would lead to changes and and more appreciation for the former category. Falkenberg (from an old German noble family) was particulary pleased that his son Melker (a captain in Lewenhaupt's regiment) had taken part in the campaigns and in some small way contributed to the successes.
Melker Falkenberg would eventually become colonel of Västmanland's regiment and fell at Moss in 1716. This particulary branch of the family (Falkenberg af Bålby) still exists today.
Source: Riksarkivet, E 4645
On 17 August 1701 a Polish messenger arrived in the Swedish headquarters at Bixten (today Biksti in Latvia). Gustaf Adlerfelt calls him "the starosta Potocki, a son of the Crown Hetman" and states that he came on behalf of Cardinal Radziejowski, who wanted to tell Charles XII that it was not a very good idea to insist upon the removal of King Augustus. The Poles did not like this at all, according to Radziejowski. If Charles however would drop this proposal the Cardinal and the Republic would be ready to work for peace and were prepared to offer satisfaction.
Later historians have had very little to add. Carl von Rosen in 1935 simply followed Nordberg (whose account is very similar to Adlerfelt's) and Gustaf Jonasson did the same in 1960. According to Jonasson the starosta was called Józef Potocki, a name he likely got from Nordberg's index.
The Grand Crown Hetman in 1701 was Stanisław Jan Jabłonowski, so the messenger was rather a son of Field Hetman Feliks Kazimierz Potocki. Hetman Potocki had several sons: Michał, Józef Felicjan, Stanisław and Jerzy. Circumstantial evidence would seem to suggest that Nordberg likely got the name Józef from more famous Voivode of Kiev, later a close ally of the Swedes and that the messenger was in fact Michał, starosta of Krasnystaw since 1686 and one of the most "difficult" Polish leaders the Swedes faced during the Great Northern War. In 1702-1703 he repeatedly tricked the Swedes (most notably the cunning Magnus Stenbock), but eventually regained the favor of Charles XII and fought at Kalisz in 1706 (where his units rapidly fled). When Augustus returned to Poland in 1709 Michał Potocki left the Swedish side and then soon enough broke with Augustus again, joining Jan Grudziński's raid into Poland in 1712. A few years later he fought the Saxons as member of the Tarnogrod Confederation. When Augustus died in 1733 Michał Potocki followed the example of many of his old Swedish and Polish comrades in arms and joined Stanisław Leszczyński's side once more. Eventually unsuccessful this time as well he reconciled with the victorious Augustus III. He died in 1749 and was buried in Sędziszów Małopolski.
About two years ago I wrote about the apparent friendship between Carl Magnus Stuart and Wolmar Anton von Schlippenbach, the commander of the army in Livonia. In a letter dated 4 October 1701 Stuart advised Schlippenbach to remain at his post and assured him that he was just as unhappy about the King's decision to abandon the plan to move against the Russians after the Saxons had been driven away from Riga. Another slightly misplaced document further confirms their relationship.
On 19 June 1701 Stuart wrote to his friend from the camp at Terrafer (Tõravere), expressing gratitude for the many letters Schlippenbach had sent him. Stuart had not had the opportunity to reply to them before, so he also wanted to express his happiness on hearing about Schlippenbach's many successful raids during the preceding year and during the winter. These had proved to Charles XII that Stuart's high opinion of Schlippenbach was fully justified. The King was now marching towards Düna with 24,000 men and would leave 6,000 at the Russian border. This force would hopefully be able to protect Livonia, so that something considerable could be achieved during the autumn.
Riksarkivet, M 1414 (letters to Schlippenbach from Stuart during 1702).
The news about the meeting at Jurburg reached Riga in early April. On the 9th Governor General Dahlbergh wrote to Major General Horn in Narva, telling him that the meeting had been followed by an advance by the Swedish army, apparently towards Warsaw. Dahlbergh prayed that the enterprise would end well, noting that it had been reported from Poland that Great Crown Hetman Jabłonowski had died - "we have lost a man of good intentions."
Two days earlier Dahlbergh had informed the Chancery in Stockholm. Jabłonowski had, he said, on a number of occasions made considerable efforts for the common good.
Sources:
LVVA, fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 74
Riksarkivet, Kanslikollegium E VII : 5
.
In the afternoon Piper held another meeting, undoubtedly of more lasting consequences. The Grand Treasurer of Lithuania Benedykt Sapieha, his ally Kazimierz Michał Pac and one of his sons along with one of Hetman Sapieha's sons met with Piper, Josias Cederhielm and Georg Wachschlager, the Swedish envoy in Warsaw. After some initial pleasantries the Grand Treasurer expressed his gratitude for the assistance given to his family by Charles XII. Pac pointed out that his actions had resulted in breaking up of the recent diet in Warsaw. Piper assured him that Charles XII was well aware of it and would remember Pac's effort. Piper then asked Sapieha to list the issues he wanted to have discussed and clarified. They were:
1. What were the King's intentions?
2. That Sapieha and the magnates he had consulted wanted a good relationship beween Sweden and the Republic.
3. That they wanted a such a close relationship between Sweden and the Republic that the interests of the two countries would be firmly united.
4. That a suitable method for bringing this into fruition would be found.
Benedykt Sapieha then asked: Did Charles XII still insist on having King Augustus removed from the throne? Yes, Piper replied, Charles could not change his mind on that point as he viewed the dethronisation as the only method of bringing security to Sweden as well as to the Republic. Sapieha agreed and stated the most Poles shared this view, but they had not had the resources to act. There was also uncertainty about the Swedish intentions. Some believed that Charles wanted to make large conquests from the Republic. It was, Sapieha emphasized, absolutely vital for Charles to make a firm statement about his aims. Piper replied that these were well-known and the King was a man of his word. It was unnecessary to have doubts on this point. Charles XII wanted to have Augustus removed because this was the only way to bring Sweden and the Republic together in an alliance for mutual benefit. The King's program was:
1. The removal of King Augustus
2. The election of a new Polish king with whom a good friendship could be entertained.
3. The full restitution of the Sapieha family.
The first two had long been the King's position, but the third was new. Charles XII had realized, Piper said, that he and the Sapieha family had a common interest. The Sapiehas had proved their friendship and deserved Swedish support. While Piper explained this, the Grand Treasurer got tears in his eyes and said that the Sapiehas would for the rest of their lives remain faithful to Charles. The Republic was, he assured Piper, well pleased with the King's declaration of his intentions.
(To be continued...)
Source: Riksarkivet, Diplomatica, Polonica, vol. 310