From a bureaucratic standpoint it became clear to the Department of Defense (DOD) that responsibility for police training should rest with ICITAP, and the general tone of the interagency discussions on policing training reflected “over to you ICITAP.” Although ICITAP representatives accepted this responsibility, it was a task for which they had no experience and little capability. ICITAP would eventually do the job, but time was required to respond effectively. One ICITAP official described the task as comparable to standing up a civilian police force in Japan after World War II.⁴³ This delay presented military forces with several problems.

First, ICITAP, although given the mission to train the PNP and Judicial Technical Police, had no programs or personnel for this purpose, and, therefore, was not immediately able to assemble an adequate training program. During this void, U.S. military personnel, under control of the MSG, carried out patrols and in the process “advised” and acted as “monitors” of training and served as “examples” for the PNP.⁴⁴ They also participated in joint patrols, thereby providing the population “with a sense of security.”⁴⁵ Defense and State Department officials were concerned lest these activities be perceived to be illegal. In coordination with SOUTHCOM, the Embassy provided a message which described the function of the military as liaison and coordination, not police training. These “rules of engagement” were critical in order to pass the “legal litmus test.”⁴⁶

Second, Thurman recognized that a fully coordinated strategy of reinforcing programs would be required if the desired end-state was to be achieved. This had not been accomplished in the Prayerbook planning or in the aftermath of Just Cause and the creation of the MSG. The MSG would only be one part of a larger program. Absent an approved, cohesive plan emerging from interagency deliberations in Washington, General Thurman engaged a contracting firm to produce an integrated, holistic strategy. Because of illness after June 1990, however, the general was unable to press for and secure approval of his plan.⁴⁷

Third, U.S. proposals had to be approved by the Panamanian Government. This took time. Unity of effort was eventually achieved as a result of ad hoc development of personal relationships between the MSG and General Thurman, Ambassador Hinton, President Endara, and Vice-Presidents Calderon and Ford.⁴⁸ Even with good coordination, the Panamanian Government had its own strong views on how the post-Noriega internal security apparatus ought to be strengthened and did not agree with everything the United States wanted.

After the inauguration of President Endara and his two Vice Presidents as the legal government on December 19, 1989, the public security function formally became their responsibility. Yet, the new government had neither a police force nor the resources to create one. U.S. policy favored withdrawal of U.S. military presence as rapidly as possible, particularly to the extent that it was performing highly visible civilian police functions.

It was essential to get Panamanian police visibly on the streets. One option was to cashier all previous members of the PDF and recruit an entirely new force. This would have taken years to implement properly, and the United States would have been required to maintain the role of an “occupying power” to ensure public order in the interim. This option also risked leaving 14,000 trained, disenfranchised, and disgruntled former military and police without jobs, inviting the development of an organized and violent opposition.⁴⁹

The second alternative was to organize a police force from among former members of the PDF. This option had the advantage of enabling the new Panamanian Government to restore order rapidly while maintaining a measure of Panamanian, rather than U.S., control. Nonetheless, the loyalty of these individuals would be in question, and this approach would be politically unpopular because of general public fear and distrust of the PDF.⁵⁰

The third option was a compromise. The Panamanian Government and its U.S. mentors would employ PDF members as the core of a new police force, the Fuerza Publica de Panama (FPP). This approach was ultimately selected owing to the urgency of the situation.

To implement its decision, the government imposed several conditions:

The new Panamanian Government, with assistance from U.S. civilian and military officials familiar with the PDF, screened former personnel and relieved those known to have been corrupt or abusive of human rights. This process eventually eliminated all colonels, 83 percent of lieutenant colonels, 39 percent of majors, 31 percent of captains, 19 percent of lieutenants, and many of the lower ranks.⁵² The remainder were incorporated into the new police forces. Personnel of the old Departamento Nacional de Investigaciones (DENI) formed the new Policia Tecnica Judicial (PTJ), and personnel of the old PDF formed the new FPP/PNP.⁵³ The PNP became a uniformed police agency responsible for daily law enforcement functions, such as maintenance of order, community patrol, movement of traffic, and initial response to crimes. The PTJ assumed primary criminal investigative responsibilities.

The United States provided a level of assistance sufficient to allow the Panamanians to start to build the new police force, but it was not adequate to prevent continued dependence on the United States or to achieve the thorough professionalization of the organization.⁵⁴ Issues related to the equipping and training of the PNP illustrate this problem.

Equipping the PNP with weapons, uniforms, radios, vehicles, and other equipment was accomplished using existing U.S. security assistance funds, U.S. uniforms under the congressional waiver of Section 660, as well as former PDF equipment. Many of the recovered weapons turned out to be “damaged goods,” however, so use of security assistance funds was required to outfit the PNP. PDF vehicles were refurbished by U.S. forces using operational funds under the authority of Operation Just Cause until January 20, 1990, when DOD directed that this practice cease. Thus, only 40 patrol cars became available to the PNP. Consequently, security assistance money had to be used to obtain surplus U.S. military trucks and new Chevrolet patrol cars. While awaiting arrival of these vehicles, the only way mounted patrols could be conducted under peacetime rules was as joint patrols with U.S. Military Police in the latter’s vehicles. Concern for the high U.S. military profile created by patrolling in U.S. military vehicles caused the MSG to lease civilian patrol cars for the joint patrols. Under the law, however, only U.S. personnel could drive them.⁵⁵

A related concern involved the large number of weapons that had fallen into the hands of Panamanian citizens. Hence, an attractive weapons buy-back program was instituted. This program was successful in getting weapons off the street and contributed to public order.⁵⁶

Training the new PNP proved to be a difficult and complex process. ICITAP was tasked to create a civilian police force, impart modern methods of policing, and replace the U.S. military as advisors to the PNP. Its statutory authority was limited to developing criminal investigations, forensics, and administrative capabilities of Latin American security forces and to curriculum development. Its work up until that time had focused on investigative units rather than training “cops on the beat.” Nor did it have any previous experience in the design and development of a public security institution-building project, let alone one of the magnitude and complexity of the Panama project.⁵⁷

Nevertheless, in January 1990, ICITAP was tasked to develop a 2?-year plan to restore law enforcement services in Panama. At the time of Just Cause, ICITAP was staffed by FBI Special Agents and other civilians with law enforcement investigative experience. The project received a total of $13.2 million from the State Department’s Inter-American Affairs Bureau.⁵⁸ ICITAP collected information through on-site observations and consultative contacts with senior Panamanian Government and police officials. This was used to assess the training and resource needs of the PNP and subsequently formulate a Panama Program Description and Budget. An initial plan was published in February 1990, but approximately 4 months later, a much more expanded and detailed project plan had been developed and approved.

As a result of the delay in ICITAP startup, Ambassador Hinton made no effort to move the U.S. military out of its relationship with the PNP. Indeed, the PNP called on the MSG to provide a team of reservists who were policemen in civilian life to develop a short, 20-hour transition training course. These military reservists continued for an extended period in a liaison function under the “rules of engagement,” discussed above, crafted by Deputy Chief of Mission Bushnell and approved by the interagency process. Ambassador Hinton was generally satisfied with the job done by reserve MPs although he was concerned about the way the military attempted to organize the Panamanian police along military instead of police organizational lines.⁵⁹

Although it recognized the difference in scope and magnitude of the task, ICITAP initially continued the approach it had been using in other Latin American countries, that is, a series of short seminars and courses, taught in English, by instructors drawn mainly from the ranks of retired FBI agents. Those instructors were contracted by ICITAP’s “permanent” consulting firm which handled the organizations’ logistics. The most important course was the 120-hour “transition” training for former PDF members selected to become part of the new PNP, which included police ethics and community relations. This course replaced the 20-hour course which served as a stop-gap measure until the preparation for the former was complete.

ICITAP’s startup problem was compounded by the fact that, for its first 6 months, it had no permanent staff in Panama,⁶⁰ although the ICITAP Director and Deputy Director alternated in running the operation there. However, by-mid 1990, ICITAP had established a permanent presence in Panama with several professionals. Its most successful program was the establishment of a Police Academy in September 1990. The first class of 250 recruits began training in November 1990 and graduated in February 1991. ICITAP also established training centers throughout the country. Forty-eight cadets from the former PDF military academy were selected to form a leadership nucleus for the future PNP. These cadets were provided funding to attend an 8-week program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia.⁶¹

ICITAP also began providing assistance in 1990 to the reconstituted Judicial Technical Police (PTJ), including instruction, upgraded forensic capabilities, and a new laboratory (completed in September 1991). Some 350 former investigative officials were purged by combined efforts of ICITAP and the new government and were replaced by vetted former PDF members.

By mid-1996, Panamanian instructors, themselves trained by ICITAP, were conducting all cadet training at the PNP Academy. A total of 4,500 new cadets completed basic training courses, and 2,500 officers had taken advanced courses. ICITAP also worked with the Panamanian Government to create a special unit to investigate money laundering and to develop other capabilities designed to cope with the huge problem of narcotics trafficking.

At the outset, a majority of Panamanians welcomed and supported the U.S. intervention. The lasting legacy of this action, however, will be greatly influenced by the outcome of U.S.-supported efforts to reform the public security institutions. Over time it has become obvious that incorporating officers and men from the PDF into the “new” Public Force inevitably meant that much of the deviant subcultures and corruption which characterized Noriega’s PDF continued to survive. In spite of the resources that were allocated to the re-establishment and sustainment of the police force, much more will be required if Panama is to have an effective police force with the confidence of the public. This is even more true for the judicial and penal systems that must be in place for the police force to be effective.

The legal, judicial, and penal systems do not function well today—even though this may not distinguish Panama from various other Central American or Caribbean countries. Cases do not get tried; people languish in pretrial detention for months and years;⁶² jails continue to be excessively overcrowded and violent. So far as the public is concerned, the failure of law enforcement is exemplified by the fact that 7 years after Just Cause, the 1984 Spadafora torture and murder case still had not been brought to trial.

There has been a marked failure to create a professional, nonpolitical PNP and supporting judicial system. U.S. training and support made the organization technically more proficient but did not lessen the institution’s propensity for corruption or alter its fundamental hostility toward the democratic process.⁶³ The police organization has continued to be structured along the same unitary lines as the old PDF. In general, the most competent officers were also the most loyal to Noriega—and tainted. When these were purged, the least competent remained. Ambassador Hinton cites the inability of the PNP to cope with the demonstration against President Bush as an example. On the other hand, a recent State Department visitor to Panama City observed the PNP peacefully clear the streets of a large crowd of angry demonstrators, maintaining discipline and avoiding the use of forceful measures despite the killing of a policeman by a large stone dropped from a nearby building.

An indicator of the level of public insecurity is the large number of private security guards stationed at many commercial and residential properties, a phenomenon common to many other Latin American countries. There are over 100 highly paid private security agencies that together have nearly as many armed personnel as the entire PNP. Because of the high crime rate, and because businessmen do not trust the police, a whole new set of “private armies” has been created, replacing the “fee for services” system formerly employed by the old PDF. Excessive numbers of PNP personnel are used for static guard duty to protect homes and offices of senior government officials and political figures, contrary to the blandishments of ICITAP. This combination of large numbers of government-sanctioned armed forces has potentially militarized Panamanian society.⁶⁴ To date, this has not resulted in armed feuds, however, and Panama is certainly not the only country to be affected by this troubling regional trend.

The public security mission within Operation Just Cause did not unfold gracefully for various reasons. The requirement became apparent only after the intervention was underway, thus the response was ad hoc. Military police from the 18^th Airborne Corps, troops from the 193^rd Infantry Brigade, and Special Forces troops were used to deal with the general looting and chaos occasioned by the destruction of the PDF and absence of other law enforcement elements in Panama City. Although the plan eventually invoked, Blind Logic, included public security measures, it did not envision the immediate vetting of the PDF or its reconstitution as the PNP. U.S. infantry troops were augmented by military police reinforcements and by the quick-fix creation of a “new” Panamanian police force made up of fully screened former PDF officers and men. Use of civilian “jurists” was not originally part of Just Cause. They were called upon later (via the U.S. Agency for International Development, AID) but had limited resources and preparation. Joint U.S. military-Panamanian patrols provided public security until they were replaced by the new PNP with limited ICITAP assistance.⁶⁵ After the initial delay in getting organized, the ICITAP training program began to function effectively. Congress, by assigning ICITAP the mission of training the entire PNP, a mission for which it was unprepared, while prohibiting the military from this mission, unknowingly legislated a security gap. Because of the success of ICITAP’s early programs in El Salvador, expectations were unreasonably high on the part of some in the DOD, and this may have contributed to tensions between the military and ICITAP.⁶⁶

The operational objectives of Operation Just Cause were to protect American lives, to ensure implementation of the Panama Canal Treaties, and to remove General Noriega from power. In an operational sense, however, Just Cause was clearly a success.

The strategic objective of Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty was to help establish democracy in Panama. This was understood by some as simply the inauguration of the elected Endara government. In part, this was due to a misperception as to the future role of the PDF (later the PNP) and an overoptimistic view of Endara’s ability to take control of the government and transform it into something distinct from the corrupt practices of the Noriega regime and before.

The short-term outcome was that, after about a year, the PNP had no non-PDF recruits (the 48 untainted cadets notwithstanding), corruption had reappeared, and the PNP was unable to provide a level of public security perceived as satisfactory by the Panamanian people. The long-term prospects are perhaps more promising. Some outside observers contend that both the Government and the public security apparatus are suffering a crisis of legitimacy, that while some faces have changed, the Panamanian National Police and the judicial system are today no more committed to the cause of justice than the old.⁶⁷ Others see an improved situation, comparable to or even better than some other countries in Central America with similarly troubled histories. In Panama itself, a series of six polls conducted between 1993 and 1996 showed that twice as many respondents believed that the PNP had improved under the Endara Government than believed policing had gotten worse.

The principal issues that plagued the U.S. effort to assist the Panamanian government to establish credible and legitimate public security were failure to anticipate the consequences of intervention (i.e., the deployment gap) and organizational limitations in dealing with the void in public security once it became apparent (i.e., the enforcement gap). These are not completely separate concepts but very much interrelated.

In the long run, however, the more important determinants of the impact on the public security function were the limitations of the Panamanian political process (i.e., the institutional gap).

The Deployment Gap. In this case, the deployment gap consisted of the period between the disintegration of the PDF as a result of the Just Cause intervention and the arrival of sufficient military police, Civil Affairs, and regular infantry troops to quell looting and lawlessness in major urban areas of Panama. Moreover, the gap was prolonged by the initial absence of civilian law enforcement programs. This has been attributed to the fact that planning for Just Cause was done on a very restricted basis.

Concern for operational security was paramount. During the Reagan administration, proceedings of several highly classified interagency sessions had been leaked to the press, seriously damaging the administration’s Panama policy. Because of the large U.S. population living in Panama (40,000) Just Cause had to be conducted with the utmost secrecy. The danger of a hostage situation was very real. (In fact, 13 U.S. citizens were taken hostage on December 20; all were subsequently rescued.) The fact that Just Cause was carried out without great loss of U.S. troops and only one U.S. civilian being killed was due in no small measure to the security in which the operation was planned. Nevertheless, more key individuals might have been involved in planning so that the appropriate agencies could have developed a coordinated plan for addressing the full range of public security issues raised by this action.

The Enforcement Gap. After order had been restored and civil-military activities had been routinized under the Military Support Group-Panama, the next challenge was to develop an interim Panamanian police force to assume the task of local law enforcement. U.S. military forces are prohibited from conducting police training activities, although Congress did grant a waiver for security assistance funds to be used to equip the new police force. As noted above, no advance planning had been done to fill this void, and the civilian entity belatedly assigned to perform this task, ICITAP, was not designed or staffed for rapid response, nor had it ever undertaken a project of this magnitude. A failure to grasp these limitations caused ICITAP’s military counterparts a great deal of consternation and obliged the use of MPs in a quasi-training role. ICITAP developed a 120-hour curriculum to train personnel who would be permanently retained by the PNP as well as other training programs.

The Institutional Gap. U.S. advice and training alone cannot compensate for a paralyzed judicial system, an inadequate legal code, a hopelessly overcrowded penal system, and endless political efforts to manipulate the police and the judicial process. The U.S. Government and particularly ICITAP have been in a constant struggle with the Government of Panama over reforms to the police and judicial systems. Panama has tended to retain habits ingrained over decades.

Rebuilding a civilian police force from a collapsed military establishment, moreover, presents a different set of problems than reconstituting a discrete civilian police force. It is extremely difficult to take a disbanded army and turn some of its personnel into a civilian police force that understands police-community relations, is integrated into society, and is governed by principles of human dignity and respect for the rights of individuals.

Owing to these daunting political, organizational, and cultural challenges, building a stable, well-functioning civilian police institution is a long-term proposition. Enough time must be programmed into such projects to allow for systematic and comprehensive institution-building, including the development of policies and procedures, management capabilities, and administrative infrastructures, as well as the creation of self-monitoring, internal affairs functions.

Given the enormity of the challenges before it, ICITAP has made substantial contributions over time to enhancing the capacity of Panamanian public security forces. Developing policing capacity, however, is a necessary but not sufficient condition to produce a public security establishment capable of providing law, order, and justice. Ultimately, the requisite political will must be present to make reform work. Political elites must adopt these goals as their own, otherwise, assistance programs will run the risk of merely making corrupt systems more efficient.

Some significant progress seems to have been made in Panama by dint of sustained efforts by ICITAP and the Panamanian Government, even if important problems remain. However, it is important to realize that U.S. expectations for foreign law enforcement institutions may not be fully achieved, no matter how much help is provided.

The interagency politico-military plan which was used in Haiti and continues to be refined is an outgrowth of both the Panama and Somalia experiences. It must be remembered that with these latter operations as well as Bosnia, secrecy was not a concern. In fact, military movements were intentionally made public.

On a negative note, the weapons buy-back program that was successful in Panama was not successful in Somalia. A lesson here is to look at the culture. Panama has traditionally been a nonviolent society and owning a weapon has no particular significance. In Somalia, owning a weapon is associated with manhood.⁶⁸

The difficulty in pinpointing Noriega’s location, sophisticated intelligence notwithstanding, was revisited in Somalia in the attempt to apprehend Aideed, and proved it to be a nearly impossible task.

Perhaps the most important lesson from Just Cause is the recognition of the need for an international civilian police contingent to fill the security gap that neither the military nor ICITAP alone can or should be expected to fill.

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Chapter 2

Robert B. Oakley - Michael J. Dziedzic - Eliot M. Goldberg

Published by 

NDU Press

National Defense University