WHO

U.S. Military Role in Continued Panama Canal Treaty Implementation (1986-1999) -- Planning and Executing Withdrawal of U.S. Military Presence in Panama

Initial planning

Seven years after initial implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty on October 1, 1979 , planning for the U.S. military withdrawal from Panama by the end of 1999 began in 1986 by the U.S. Southern Command (SouthCom) in coordination with other Department of Defense agencies. SouthCom established a Treaty Implementation Planning (TIP) cell within its J5/ Strategy, Policy & Plans Directorate, later consolidated with SouthCom's Center for Treaty Affairs (renamed Center for Treaty Implementation) after 1990.

Such planning was imperative because the Panama Canal Treaty provided only a general framework for the U.S. military presence in Panama . Furthermore, one of the principal documents associated with the Treaty (Agreement in Implementation of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977) provided specific dates for transferring specified military properties only through 1984 -- the first five years of the 20-year transition period. The remaining properties were to be transferred some time during the life of the Treaty, when no longer needed by the U.S. military, or by the Treaty's end date -- December 31, 1999.) Also required were appropriate guidance, direction, and resources from the Department of Defense to the military Departments and the Southern Command needed to carry out the transfers of properties and drawdown of the military forces.

Major challenges

Even with seven years of operating under the Panama Canal Treaty (through the bi-national Joint Committee), SouthCom faced an unprecedented challenge of dismantling an eight-decade military presence in Panama and relocating one of the Department of Defense's major regional unified command's out of Panama while continuing its missions. (That was about five years before the unexpected fall of both the Berlin Wall and Communism followed by the ensuring drawdown of U.S military forces in the United States and Europe and the first rounds of military base closings in the United States and Germany. Those drawdowns and base closings -- along with the 1992 withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the Philippines -- all provided valuable experience in base closure and their conversion to civilian use.) One of the driving objectives was to fully comply with the Panama Canal Treaties, while continuing to ensure the proper mix of forces assigned against assigned missions.

As a gage of the magnitude of the challenge, of the total area that was under the control of the U.S. military in Panama before the Treaty went into effect in 1979 (95,293 acres with about 5,237 buildings) only about 15 percent had been transferred to the Government of Panama by the end of 1984. (But all Treaty-required transfers by that date were accomplished successfully and on time.) Left to be transferred to

Panama by the end of 1999 were roughly 77,000 acres with about 4,400 buildings.

A preliminary Treaty Implementation Plan was developed as an initial blueprint for an orderly phased withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Panama by the end of this century and phased schedule for transferring the U.S. military bases, installations, and other facilities and properties to the Government of Panama. It was approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in February 1988, and a supporting, more detailed TIP framework plan was developed in early 1989.

Panama Political Crisis (1985-1989) Affected Planning

However, events in Panama (the worsening internal political crisis during the latter part of the Manuel Noriega regime from 1987 through 1989) and elsewhere in the region as well as in Europe (1989-1990) were to have a profound impact on continued treaty implementation planning during that period, forcing changes in some of the basic assumptions as well as timing of planned execution of phases of the planning.

In July 1987, the United States suspended military and economic assistance to Panama in protest against a government-sponsored attack on the American Embassy in Panama City in late June following a period of several public demonstrations against the Noriega regime since early June of that year. Another reason for the suspension (which affected training as well as other security assistance funding for the Panamanian military) was the deteriorating human rights situation in Panama. In December 1987, the U.S. Congress made mandatory the suspension of such assistance to Panama (except humanitarian and scholarship assistance), with resumption of such aid conditioned on U.S. presidential certification of key democratic reforms.

As the crisis intensified by 1989, it became increasingly obvious that there was not the political will to consider any further turning over U.S. military properties to Panama while the Noriega regime was in power. Noriega's nullifying the May 1989 presidential election results followed by repressive tactics and continued harassment of military personnel, family members, and operations by the Panamanian military did not mitigate the situation.

Another factor in play was the Treaty requirement for reversing the nationalities of the Administrator and Deputy Administrator of the Panama Canal Commission on January 1, 1990. (Until that date, the Administrator was American and the Deputy Administrator was Panamanian, with the roles to be reversed on that date for the final decade of the Treaty.)

Suspension of Continued Treaty Transition Planning in 1989

After rejecting in late 1989 the Noriega regime's nomination (ADD NAME) to be the first Panamanian Administrator, President George Bush asked PCC's Deputy Administrator Fernando Manfredo since October 1979 to serve as acting Administrator from January 1, 1990, until a suitable nomination was received from Panama. (The Treaty specified that Panamanian nationals for the positions of Administrator, Deputy Administrator, and the four Panamanian members of the PCC Board of Directors be proposed by Panama to the U.S. Government for appointment to such positions by the latter.) Manfredo served as acting Administrator until September 1990 when Gilberto Guardia F. was sworn in after his nomination (proposed by Panamanian President Guillermo Endara and nominated by President George H. W. Bush) was confirmed by the U.S. Senate.

Nevertheless, in the face of an intensifying disinformation campaign against the United States waged by the Noriega regime, U.S. Government agencies, including SouthCom insisted that they would continue to abide by the Panama Canal Treaties, including publicly announcing in December 1988 an initial list of proposed candidate sites for the eventual relocation of SouthCom headquarters. (That list was later superceded in 1994 by a much more extensive list of proposed sites after additional studies were conducted on the SouthCom relocation. Miami one of the last candidate sites added to the list, was the one chosen in 1995.) Maintaining the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties was to become one of the four principal reasons for Operation Just Cause.

Elsewhere, with the fall of Communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, the Soviets' surrogate in Latin America (Cuba) lost the significant economic and military aid that had for years helped it to be a major threat to the region. Likewise, the surprise voting out of power of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in February 1990 further diminished the serious security threats facing the region up until then.

Planning Resumed With Revised Guidance in 1990

Following the U.S. military's Operation Just Cause (December 20, 1989 invasion in Panama) and the restoration of a democratic government in Panama (headed by President Guillermo Endara who had won the May 1999 elections, which had been nullified by Noriega three days later), the United States resumed the planning process in 1990 but with a somewhat different focus.

The abolishment of the Panamanian military (the Panama Defense Forces) by the Panamanian government following Operation Just Cause necessitated some changes in the philosophy guiding the planning process. Most notably was consideration for the intended end use of transferred properties. The planning for previous U.S.

military property transfers (those effected 1979-1984) assumed that military facilities (bases, barracks, training ranges, etc.) would be used by the Panamanian military for like purposes, which generally occurred.

Beginning in 1990, earlier plans were revised to comply with new U.S. Government policy and Department of Defense guidance to execute the military drawdown in Panama in a controlled, systematic fashion which would provide the Government of Panama the greatest opportunity to re-utilize the transferring properties to their maximum economic benefit. There was also the desire to work with the Panamanian government to develop the best conditions for a successful and smooth transfer of facilities with the least disruption to the Panamanian economy. However, decisions on how to make the most effective use of transferred properties were Panama's challenge.

Final Treaty Implementation Plan approved in 1992

The Panama Canal Treaty Implementation Plan (PC TIP), approved by the Secretary of Defense on February 3, 1992, superseded all earlier related plans and provided conceptual guidance and direction to all U.S. Department of Defense agencies in carrying out the phased withdrawal of the U.S. troops in Panama and the gradual transfer to Panama of all the U.S. military controlled installations, facilities, and lands by the end of 1999. It was designed as a flexible and dynamic plan to be updated annually, giving the SouthCom commander in chief the opportunity to make adjustments as necessary to fulfill his responsibilities.

The Panama Canal Treaty Implementation Plan was developed by Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command and its component services (Army, Air Force, and Navy/Marines) in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Department of the Army was designated executive agent to coordinate follow-on plans and those fiscal and logistical requirements which not unique to a specific military service. The U.S. Southern Command's Center for Treaty Implementation coordinated planning for continued implementation of the treaties. The Center has been SouthCom's interface with the TIP executive agent (the Panama Canal Treaty Implementation Planning Agency within Headquarters, Department of the Army), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Embassy in Panama, the Panama Canal Commission, and, since 1992, the Government of Panama for treaty implementation issues. (Another guiding principle early on was to develop a unified and approved U.S. Government position on such planning before any discussions be held with Panamanian officials.) Later in 1992, execution plans were developed by SouthCom's three service components which detailed their plans to implement the basic plan.

Governing Treaty Implementation Planning guidance

Principal policy guidance governing the revised TIP planning included:

	Fully comply with the Panama Canal Treaties;
	Support democratic and economic growth in Panama;
	Keep a credible/flexible force protection capability;
	Keep SouthCom as a viable, engaged, and increasingly effective unified command throughout the drawdown from Panama and beyond;
	Consolidate base operations functions to maximum extent possible -- keep quality of life high (to this end, the plan was designed to ensure availability of sufficient hospitals, schools, recreational, and shopping facilities throughout the drawdown to support the remaining population); and
	Draw down civilian employees as same rate as military.

Working with Panama

In April 1992, the approved Panama Canal Treaty Implementation Plan was presented to President Endara and members of his cabinet and later to other government officials. Almost immediately afterward, SouthCom started conducting tours of selected military facilities on the Pacific and Atlantic side of the isthmus initially for officials of the Panamanian government and since then through 1999 also for potential investors at the request of the Panamanian government to provide them an idea of the magnitude of the installations, facilities, and areas transferring to Panama. Since then, TIP planning had included consulting with key Panamanian government officials to ensure a smooth transition through 1999.

Panama's Interoceanic Region Authority (ARI) was established by Panamanian law in 1993 to manage, promote, and dispose of the vast properties in the Panama Canal Area transferred by the United States . (Before then, little planning/coordination with the U.S. military (particularly for appropriate uses of the U.S. military bases and other properties) was conducted by the Panamanian government -- during the Torrijos and Noriega regimes -- for handling transferred properties. In essence, Panama had lost about 15 years of the 20-year transition period to prepare itself for the major changes and challenges by the end of the century.)

ARI's challenge was preparing for receiving and managing the remaining 85 percent of U.S. military properties to be transferred by the end of 1999. Its first acceptance of transferring military property was the Coco Solo medical facility in May 1993. (More discussion on ARI and its projects can be found in the section of this website entitled Panama's Interoceanic Region Authority or ARI.)