PANAMA CANAL TREATY TRANSITION

(OCTOBER 1979 - DECEMBER 1999)

IMPACT OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES OF 1977 

ON THE PANAMA CANAL

On September 7, 1977 -- 73 years after the signing of the 1903 treaty -- President Jimmy Carter and Panamanian Head of Government Brigadier General Omar Torrijos signed in Washington, D.C., two treaties dealing with the Panama Canal and a new relationship between the two countries. The high profile signing ceremony in the headquarters of the Organization of American States was witnessed by several heads of state from the region and the diplomatic corps. Those treaties are:

PURPOSE OF THE TREATIES

In negotiating these treaties, the United States proceeded on the assumption that they would serve the national interest by ensuring that the canal would continue to be efficiently operated, secure, neutral, and open to all nations on a nondiscriminatory basis. Fundamental to this objective was the cooperation of Panama. By responding to Panamanian aspirations, the United States intended to provide a more satisfactory environment for the operation and defense of the canal.

The new treaties provided a basis for a new partnership between the United States and Panama. They replaced the U.S.-Panama Treaty of 1903 (known as the Hay/Bunau-Varilla Treaty), which governed canal operations since the waterway's construction (completed and opened to world commerce in 1914) and subsequent revisions to it by the treaties of 1936 and 1955 which modified some of its terms.

HISTORY OF TREATY NEGOTIATIONS 

Panamanian foreign policy focused on the Panama Canal virtually since its completion in 1914.

In November 1903, the United States and the Republic of Panama signed a treaty for the canal concession fifteen days after Panama had declared her independence from Colombia on November 3, and the United States promptly recognized the new nation.

The treaty (negotiated on behalf of the new nation -- but not necessarily with in its best interests in mind -- by the Frenchman Philippe Burnau-Varilla) gave the United States not only the right to build a canal but also the rights, power, and authority to exercise to exercise jurisdiction, "as it sovereign, in perpetuity" over a 10-mile strip across the isthmus of Panama to be known as the Canal Zone (647 square miles total area, of which land area was 372 square miles and water area was 275 square miles). Bunau-Varilla was mostly determined to try to recoup for France at least some of the glory lost in the decade-long ill-fated French effort to construct a sea-level canal through Panama in the 1880s. With history in mind, he manipulated concessions for the treaty which he felt would ensure acceptance by the United States Government, shortly after a similar treaty with less generous terms had been proposed by the United States and rejected by the Colombian senate.

The 1903 treaty -- which was not signed by a Panamanian -- was deeply resented by Panamanians virtually since its inception and had periodically impacted negatively on Panama-United States relations over the years. Negotiations for a new treaty had been a long-standing Panamanian priority. Such feelings, came to a head on January 9, 1964, outside the Balboa High School in the Canal Zone when Panamanian dissatisfaction sparked by an unsuccessful protest by Panamanian students after requesting to fly the Panamanian flag in front of the school where only one flag pole was located, shortly erupted into violence followed later by riots in Panama City and the city of Colon. During the violence, 21 Panamanians and four U.S. military personnel died. A few days later, Panama suspended diplomatic relations with the United States. (For detailed Panama Canal Spillway's account, visit the following site: www.czbrats.com/Articles/Flag_pole.htm.)

In June 1967, United States and Panamanian representatives completed the negotiation of three draft treaties dealing with the canal, a possible sea-level canal in Panama, and defense matters. Neither government acted further on these treaties, however, and in a new Panamanian government (established after the 1968 coup by the Panamanian National Guard) publicly rejected the proposed treaties.

Canal treaty negotiations resumed in June 1971 and continued intermittently. In February 1974, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Panamanian Foreign Minister Tack signed in Panama an "eight-point principles" agreement which served as guidelines for further negotiations. Several preliminary agreements were initialed in late 1974 and early 1975, and the negotiations continued through 1975 and 1976. They were finally concluded in 1977 after intense and-and-off negotiations and signed on September 7, 1977.

In accordance with their constitution, the Panamanian people approved the new treaties by a two-thirds majority in a plebiscite held on October 23, 1977. The U.S. Senate gave its consent to the ratification of the neutrality treaty on March 16, 1978, and the Panama Canal Treaty on April 18, 1978, both barely by a two-thirds majority. The U.S. Senate's conditions, reservations, and understandings attached to the two treaties (which were later embodied in the "Protocol of Exchange of Instruments of Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties") were accepted begrudgingly by General Torrijos who decided he need not present the changes to another plebiscite.