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Panentheism 
The term panentheism (from the Greek) literally 
means “all (is) in God.” As a concept of God, panentheism 
attempts to do justice both to divine transcendence 
(God is beyond or more than the world) 
and divine immanence (God is in the world). Panentheism 
maintains that the world is in God, included 
in the divine life, but that God’s reality is not 
reducible to nor exhausted by the reality of the 
individuals or the structures of the universe or of 
the universe as a whole. Thus God is all-inclusive or 
all-encompassing with respect to being. 
Strictly construed this entails that all divine relations 
are internal relations, that is, relations between 
God as integrated whole and the creatures 
as included parts. For panentheism then, while the 
universe is part of God, God and the universe do 
not form an undifferentiated whole. Panentheism 
draws definite distinctions between God as the including 
whole and the non-divine parts of the universe 
considered in themselves. Certain properties 
of divinity, such as aseity (self-existence) or necessary 
existence and the all-encompassing attributes 
of omnipresence (everywhere present), omniscience 
(all-knowing), and omnipotence (all power 
or all-powerful) apply to God but definitely not to 
individual creatures or to the universe itself. (Note 
though that process forms of panentheism find the 
notion of divine omnipotence problematic.) 
Another important distinction drawn between 
God and creatures concerns mutual freedom. Panentheism 
upholds indeterminism: Spontaneity 
and free will in the universe mean that antecedent 
causes do not fully determine present events and 
actions, so the future is not fully predictable or 
foreknown, even by God; creatures have real 
choices. In summary, while God is not an individual 
simply distinct from the nondivine individuals, 
in the way, for example, that one human being is 
distinct from another, neither is God to be equated 
with the universe or its constituents. 
 
Panentheism as alternative 
In construing divine transcendence and immanence 
as above, panentheism mediates between 
deism and certain forms of traditional theism on 
the one hand and pantheism on the other hand, attempting 
to avoid pitfalls of both. Deism, as developed 
in the European Enlightenment of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, holds that God 
created the world to operate according to natural 
laws but is uninvolved in its destiny. The God 
posited by traditional theism is not as separate 
from the universe as is in deism; however, panentheists 
judge what they call classical theism to be 
equally inadequate. Classical theism, in affirming 
certain divine attributes stemming from ancient 
Greek philosophy—immutability (unchangeability), 
impassibility (to be unaffected by another), 
and eternity (in the sense of strict timelessness)— 
does not permit God to be in genuine relation to 
the world. 
The term pantheism literally means “all (is) 
God.” That is, everything at least in its true essence 
is divine. Clearly panentheism has affinities with 
pantheism. American Charles Hartshorne (1897– 
2000), the principle theological interpreter and developer 
of process philosophy, at first labeled his 
concept of God “The New Pantheism.” The trajectory 
of German idealism produced both pantheists 
and panentheists. One could say that panentheism 
attempts to get as close to pantheism as possible in 
stressing the intimate relationship between God 
and nature, while still maintaining clear distinctions 
between them. A key difference is that pantheism 
tends to a (quasi) materialistic or (quasi) substantialistic 
understanding of God: Entities in the world 
share the divine essence or substance to a greater 
or lesser degree. Therefore, any distinction between 
God as a whole and the constituents of the 
universe is a matter of degree rather than of kind. 
In addition, since everything is a mode or attribute 
of God, pantheism typically denies indeterminate 
freedom. 
The metaphor or analogy of the world as the 
body of God is popular among panentheists. 
Hartshorne compares the God-world relationship 
to that between a person’s mind and the cells of its 
body. Arthur Peacocke (1924– ), a key figure in the 
science and religion dialogue, speaks approvingly 
of the feminine, womb imagery that panentheism 
encourages: As with a fetus in its mother, creation 
is within God. American Christian theologian Sallie 
McFague (1933– ) has been the principal developer 
of the metaphor of world as body of 
God. British philosophical theologian Grace 
Jantzen (1948– ), in drawing the connection between 
God and world so tightly as to jettison indeterminate 
freedom, offers a pantheistic version 
of the metaphor. 
 
Some connections with science 
Panentheism offers diverse advantages for those 
interested in the intersection of science and religion. 
Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947), in his 
role as a philosopher of science, and others have 
observed that the dominant model for the natural 
world moved from mechanism to organism during 
the nineteenth century. Panentheism offers an 
organistic understanding of the God-world relation 
in contrast to deism’s mechanistic understanding. 
Like deism, panentheism offers a concept of God 
where natural laws or processes are respected, 
where God refrains from interventions that overturn 
nature. The crucial difference is that panentheism 
posits a God intimately involved, continuously 
interacting, with the world. 
Panentheism’s intimate connection of God with 
a world in time entails a God who in some sense or 
dimension is also temporal. As the trajectory of 
modern science—from the Newtonian mechanics 
of the Enlightenment to evolution to Albert Einstein’s 
theory of relativity—has put an exclamation 
point on the temporal nature of reality, panentheism 
offers a consonant concept of the divine. 
As indicated above, creaturely spontaneity and 
indeterminate freedom are crucial for panentheism 
in its distinction of God from creation. Both quantum 
mechanics, in stating that the motions of subatomic 
particles are probabilistic rather than determinable 
from known antecedent conditions, and 
chaos theory, in demonstrating the unpredictability 
of future events, provide openings for panentheists 
and other supporters of indeterminacy. In particular, 
Peacocke, a British physical chemist, Anglican 
priest, and panentheistic theologian, applauds panentheism’s 
picture of a God who is continuously 
creative in relation to an open universe. It must be 
noted, though, that no consensus exists among scientists 
that quantum indeterminacy or, even less, 
chaos theory unpredictability entail any ultimate 
indeterminacy in the universe. 
Avoiding violation of natural processes is not 
only a concern of panentheists but of other theologians 
involved in the science and religion dialogue, 
including Americans Thomas F. Tracy and 
Nancey Murphy. It may seem that such thinkers 
must renounce any traditional Christian notion of 
special providence, namely, that God causes particular 
events in natural or human history (in contrast 
to general providence, that God determines 
the general laws or processes of the universe), 
however, this is not uniformly the case. 
For example, in his later writings, Peacocke 
develops his notion of top-down causation, maintaining 
that divine action with respect to the universe 
not only upholds general laws or patterns 
but causes specific events. Whether such divine 
predetermination is compatible with indeterminate 
creaturely decisions and their chance interactions 
is a major difficulty for this viewpoint. 
Murphy and Tracy purchase special providence 
by positing that God determines the probabilistic 
quantum movements of subatomic particles 
and that these in turn produce macro-effects that 
result in specific events. The virtue of this notion is 
that it contravenes no natural laws or regularities: 
The quantum events that God determines are 
within the scientifically permissible ranges of motion, 
and apparently no conceivable method exists 
for discerning God’s causation on the quantum 
level. At the same time, this “invisibility” is problematic: 
That God ultimately causes a valued event 
(as opposed to, say, an event issuing in tremendous 
evil) appears to be a matter of blind faith, at 
least as far as physics is concerned. Other problems 
for this viewpoint are the speculative nature 
of the connection between quantum events and 
macro-effects and, for advocates of indeterminacy 
and openness, the denial that quantum events are 
ultimately indeterminate. More broadly, critics of 
the above approaches might judge them to be 
backdoor attempts to reintroduce too much transcendent 
or interventionist causation by God. 
 
Panentheism’s history 
The term panentheism was coined by German idealist 
philosopher Carl Christian Friedrich Krause 
(1781–1832). As mentioned above, German idealism, 
with strong ties to nature romanticism, produced 
various panentheistic and pantheistic 
thinkers. The clearest and most fully developed 
panentheistic model was that of physicist, experimental 
psychologist, and philosopher Gustav 
Theodor Fechner (1801–1887). Earlier examples of 
panentheism or panentheistic tendencies include 
Western mysticism and Hindu bhakti (referring to 
devotion to a personal god) and its principal theologian 
Ramanuja (traditional dates, 1017–1137). 
These examples are not surprising, as mysticism 
generally softens the creator-creature distinction, 
while in India that distinction is not drawn as 
sharply as is typical in Western religions. 
Various philosophers and theologians of the 
twentieth century have been labeled panentheists, 
including Nicolai Berdyaev, William Pepperell 
Montague, Paul Weiss, Karl Rahner, and John Mac- 
Quarrie. While the panentheistic affinities of these 
thinkers are undeniable, some failed to develop a 
clear panentheistic model, others promoted ideas 
contrary to basic premises of panentheism, while 
still others explicitly refused the label panentheism 
for their thought. Coming out of German idealism, 
American Paul Tillich (1886–1965), an exile from 
the Nazis, is regarded as one of the premier theologians 
of the twentieth century. Tillichians 
widely acknowledge his panentheism. His famous 
phrase, “God is not a being, but being-itself,” has 
obvious panentheistic implications. Tillich, who 
claimed the phrase “eschatological pan-en-theism,” 
was accused by some critics of pantheism, to 
which he would jokingly respond, “This pantheist 
is going to take a walk in his garden.” Tillich’s reluctance 
to disavow the attributes of divine immutability, 
impassibility, and eternity compromise 
his manifest panentheistic intentions, according to 
American theologian David Nikkel (1952– ). 
The fullest explicit development of panentheism 
in the twentieth century came from process 
thought. Whitehead, a British mathematical physicist 
and philosopher, originated process philosophy, 
its theism developed and to some extent modified 
by Hartshorne. For process thought, reality at 
its depth is not static being but rather a process of 
becoming. God is not an exception to, but the 
highest exemplar of, this ultimate or metaphysical 
principle. As did Fechner, process thought advocates 
panpsychism, that all integrated entities of the 
universe possess some degree of sentience or feeling. 
The fundamental unit of reality for process philosophy 
is an occasion of experience. God, in the 
consequent nature for Whitehead or the concrete 
pole of divinity for Hartshorne, includes all past occasions 
of experience. Process panentheism emphasizes 
omniscience and, to coin a word, omnipathy 
(all-feeling). God intimately knows all 
experience, is affected by, sympathizes with, all 
feelings. As Whitehead puts it, “God is the fellow 
sufferer who understands” (1928, p. 351). Whitehead 
purchases divine transcendence through the 
primordial nature, which is the reservoir of all possibility. 
Hartshorne purchases the same through the 
abstract pole of divinity, which refers to the 
changeless character of God, namely, that God will 
always lovingly know and integrate whatever experiences 
occur in the universe. If the world influences 
God as object of divine knowledge, God 
likewise influences the nondivine individuals as 
object of their awareness, as a lure providing 
preferences for their actions. To what extent the divine 
lure only persuades versus constrains decisions 
as the unavoidable object of awareness is debated 
by process theologians. What is beyond 
dispute is the rejection of omnipotence, if interpreted 
to mean God is all-powerful, which would 
overthrow indeterminate freedom. 
 
Contemporary issues 
McFague, mentioned earlier in relation to feminist 
divine imagery, has presented one of the most 
well-known models of panentheism in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Her development 
of metaphors for a God in intimate relation 
with the world enflesh and enhance the 
sense of the concept of panentheism. On the other 
hand, her doubts concerning what we can actually 
know about God pose a potential problem for her 
panentheism. McFague’s minimal Christian theistic 
claim is that there is a power in the universe on the 
side of life that is, metaphorically speaking, personal. 
When McFague adds that this power is 
many rather than one, critics may question 
whether God in her concept or metaphor is sufficiently 
integrated to panentheistically include the 
universe; critics may question whether there is a 
difference of substance between her view and 
American Christian theologian Gordon Kaufman’s 
serendipitous creativity, that God should refer to 
the cosmic and evolutionary forces that have resulted 
in life and human life rather than to any 
personal or agential reality. Contrast McFague’s 
outlook to that of Tillich and Hartshorne, who 
maintained that God is “not less than conscious” or 
superconscious (while recognizing the anthropomorphic 
dangers of attributing conscious personhood 
to God). 
Many theologians in the science and religion 
dialogue affirm some notion of God’s sustaining 
creativity common to the Western religious traditions: 
Every aspect of every particular constituent 
of the universe is radically contingent, dependent 
upon divine power for its continued existence moment 
by moment. Process theism rejects such an 
understanding of divine power. Whitehead is clear 
that both divine and finite occasions of experience 
are manifestations of the ultimate metaphysical 
principle of creative synthesis, each such occasion 
possessing ultimate independence of being. Whitehead 
reasons that if God were upholding the very 
existence of occasions, then indeterminate freedom 
would be overridden and his panentheism 
would transmute into a pantheism. Christian process 
theologians, while often neglecting to acknowledge 
this Whiteheadian perspective on divine 
power, have not challenged it either. The 
question for panentheists who wish to retain a notion 
of divine sustaining activity is this: Can omnipotence 
be defined as “all power” rather than 
“all-powerful”? Can God panentheistically encompass 
all power by sustaining and thus empowering 
the existence of each creature, as an existence with 
indeterminate freedom? If such a concept is not 
self-contradictory, then one can avoid pantheism 
and affirm a notion of divine power more consonant 
with the all-inclusive logic of panentheism. |