The
Art of War
The Oldest Military Treatise
in the World
By
Sun Tzu
Translated
from the Chinese
By Lionel
Giles, M.A. (1910)
Chapter
I, Laying Plans
Chapter
II, Waging War
Chapter
III, Attacking by Stratagem
Chapter
IV, Tactical Dispositions
Chapter
V, Energy
Chapter
VI, Weak Points and Strong
Chapter
VII, Maneuvering
Chapter
VIII, Variations on Tactics
Chapter
IX, The Army on the March
Chapter
X, Terrain
Chapter
XI, The Nine Situations
Chapter
XII, The attack by Fire
Chapter
XIII, The Use of Spies
Sun Tzu said:
The art of war is of vital importance to the State.
It is a matter
of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is
a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.
The art of
war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account
in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining
in the field.
These are:
(1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method
and discipline.
The Moral Law
causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they
will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.
Heaven signifies
night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.
Earth comprises
distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow
passes; the chances of life and death.
The Commander
stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely, benevolence, courage and strictness.
By method and
discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper
subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance
of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military
expenditure.
These five
heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be victorious;
he who knows them not will fail. Therefore, in your deliberations, when
seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis
of a comparison, in this wise:--
(1) Which of
the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?
(2) Which
of the two generals has most ability?
(3) With whom
lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?
(4) On which
side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
(5) Which
army is stronger?
(6) On which
side are officers and men more highly trained?
(7) In which
army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?
By means of
these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.
The general
that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: let such
a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel
nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:-- let such a one be dismissed!
While heading
the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances
over and beyond the ordinary rules.
According as
circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's plans.
All warfare
is based on deception.
Hence, when
able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem
inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away;
when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
Hold out baits
to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.
If he is secure
at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade
him.
If your opponent
is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak,
that he may grow arrogant.
If he is taking
his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them.
Attack him
where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.
These military
devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.
Now the general
who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle
is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand.
Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat:
how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point
that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.
Sun Tzu said:
In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift
chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail clad soldiers,
with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at
home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such
as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the
total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising
an army of 100,000 men.
When you engage
in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's weapons will
grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town,
you will exhaust your strength.
Again, if the
campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to
the strain.
Now, when your
weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your
treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your
extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences
that must ensue.
Thus, though
we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated
with long delays.
There is no
instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.
It is only
one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly
understand the profitable way of carrying it on.
The skillful
soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply wagons loaded
more than twice.
Bring war material
with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have
food enough for its needs.
Poverty of
the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from
a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people
to be impoverished.
On the other
hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and high prices
cause the people's substance to be drained away.
When their
substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.
With this loss
of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be
stripped bare, and three tenths of their income will be dissipated; while
government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates
and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles, draught
oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four tenths of its total revenue.
Hence a wise
general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cart load of
the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise
a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own
store.
Now in order
to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage
from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.
Therefore in
chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should
be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for
those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with
ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
This is called,
using the conquered foe to augment one's own strength.
In war, then,
let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.
Thus it may
be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate,
the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.
III. ATTACKING
BY STRATAGEM |
Sun Tzu said:
In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's
country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good.
So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to
capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.
Hence to fight
and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence
consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.
Thus the highest
form of general ship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to
prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack
the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege
walled cities.
The rule is,
not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. The preparation
of mantles, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take
up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls
will take three months more.
The general,
unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like
swarming ants, with the result that one third of his men are slain, while
the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of
a siege.
Therefore the
skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures
their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom
without lengthy operations in the field.
With his forces
intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing
a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking
by stratagem.
It is the rule
in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five
to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
If equally
matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid
the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
Hence, though
an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be
captured by the larger force.
Now the general
is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points;
the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be
weak.
There are three
ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:--
(1) By commanding
the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot
obey. This is called hobbling the army.
(2) By attempting
to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant
of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness
in the soldier's minds.
(3) By employing
the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the
military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence
of the soldiers.
But when the
army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other
feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging
victory away.
Thus we may
know that there are five essentials for victory:
(1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all
its ranks.
(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by
the sovereign.
Hence the saying:
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of
a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every
victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy
nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
The
Art of War Continued...
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